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BANKRUPTCY-UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT-RIGHTS OF ENTRUSTER TO 
A LmN INTEREST IN THE GENERAL AssETs OF BANKRUPT TRUSTEE-Plaintiff, 
a credit corporation, used a trust receipt arrangement to finance a car 
dealer, who thereafter sold a number of the entrusted cars (out of trust 
sales) without remitting the proceeds to plaintiff. In order to restore some 
of these proceeds, which had been dissipated in the course of running 
his business, the car dealer gave plaintiff a trust receipt on ten unen-
cumbered trucks in its possession, in release of part of plaintiff's security 
interest under the first trust receipts. Plaintiff later sold these ten trucks. 
Subsequently, in the course of bankruptcy proceedings filed against the 
car dealer, plaintiff sought to assert a prior lien on the bankrupt's general 
assets to recover the value of the dissipated proceeds from the original 
out of trust sales, minus the value it sought to retain from the sale of 
the ten trucks. On appeal from an order denying plaintiff's claim, held, 
affirmed. A trust receipt gives no lien interest in the proceeds of out of 
trust sales under section l 75 of the Illinois Trust Receipts Act.l The 
act creates merely a priority interest in an entruster as to proceeds, which 
is denied preferential status under the Bankruptcy Act.2 Furthermore, 
because the second trust receipt covering the ten trucks was given for the 
release of such a priority interest, it constituted a transfer of property 
for an antecedent debt within the prohibition of section 60a of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.3 In the Matter of Crosstown Motors, Inc., (7th Cir. 1959) 
272 F. (2d) 224-. 
One of the fundamental purposes of the trust receipt, under the wide-
ly adopted Uniform Trust Receipts Act,4 is to provide lenders of cer-
tain types of short term credit with a predominant security interest5 that 
will afford protection against most other types of creditors in cases of 
l " ••. the entruster shall be entitled, to the extent to which and as against all classes 
of persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the time of disposition by the 
trustee, as follows . . • (b) to any proceed or value of any proceeds (whether such pro-
ceeds are identifiable or not) of the goods, documents or instruments, if said proceeds 
were received by the trustee within ten days prior to ••• the filing of a petition in bank-
ruptcy ...• " Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 121½, §175; UTRA, §10, 9C U.L.A. 220. The 
Illinois Trust Receipts Act is an incorporation into the laws of Illinois, with some minor 
changes, none of which have any bearing on the principal case, of the Uniform Trust 
Receipts Act; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 121½, §§166-187; 9C U.L.A. 220. 
2 52 Stat. 840 (1938), as amended by 66 Stat. 426 (1952), 11 U.S.C. (1958) §104 
(Chandler Act); Strom v. Piekes, (2d Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 1003. See note, 66 YALE L. J. 
567 (1957). See, generally, Hanna, "Preferences as Affected by Section 60c and 67b of 
Bankruptcy Law," 25 WASH. L. REv. l (1950). 
3 30 Stat. 544, c. VI, §60 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1958) §96. See note 17 infra. 
4 UTRA, 9C U.L.A. 220. This act has now been adopted in 35 states, according to 
9C UL.A. (1957; Supp. 1959) at 59. 
5 See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Horan, 325 Ill. App. 625, 60 N.E. (2d) 763 (1945); 
Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment Co., 385 Ill. 211, 52 N.E. (2d) 695 (1944); Commercial 
Discount Co. v. Los Angeles County, 16 Cal. (2d) 158, 105 P. (2d) 115 (1940); General 
Finance Corp. v. Krause Motor Sales, 302 Ill. App. 210, 23 N.E. (2d) 781 (1939). See 
Bogert, "Effect of Uniform Trust Receipts Act," 3 UNrv. CHr. L. REv. 26 (1935). 
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the debtor's insolvency.6 Unfortunately, because of the varying language 
used in the act, it is not explicit whether the denominated "security in-
terest" was to be in the nature -of a lien or merely to provide a priority 
interest.7 Since the passage of the Chandler Amendment to the Bank-
ruptcy Act in 1938, state-created priorities, but not state-created liens, 
are refused preference in bankruptcy proceedings.a Consequently, the 
determination of the exact nature of the trust receipt security interest 
under state interpretations has become an issue of crucial importance to 
the entruster. Prior Illinois decisions have consistently held that the 
trust receipt, under the Illinois Trust Receipts Act, creates in the en-
truster a lien interest in the entrusted goods.9 The Illinois courts have 
not yet faced the problem of deciding whether this type of lien extends 
to the proceeds of out-of-trust sales; but from the basic nature of the 
trust receipt transaction, which anticipates a sale of the entrusted goods, 
it would seem reasonable that the lien interest afforded the entruster 
should extend at least as far as the identifiable proceeds from the out-
of-trust sales.1 0 If this hurdle can successfully be cleared there is no 
6 The only type of lien which can be perfected against the interest of the entruster is 
a special statutory lien. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) §176; UTRA, §11, 9C U.L.A. 220 at 263. 
"Special liens arising out of contractual acts of the trustee with reference to the process-
ing, warehousing, shipping or otherwise dealing with specific goods in the usual course 
of the trustee's business preparatory to their sale shall attach against the interest of the 
entruster in said goods as well as against the interest of the trustee ... :• See, generally, 
comment, 49 MICH. L. R.Ev. 243 at 248 (1950), where, in discussing the effect of such a lien 
on the entruster's interest in a bankruptcy proceeding as affected by §60a of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the author states: "The primary rule is that a transfer shall be deemed to 
have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no one subsequently 
acquiring a lien on the property transferred would thereby acquire rights therein supe-
rior to those of the transferee. This is the test to be applied to all property other than 
realty. A further limitation is found in the stipulation that the lien which is to be 
used as the test of perfection is such as is obtainable 'by legal or equitable proceedings on a 
simple contract. . . : This provision excludes the possibility of a challenge on the basis 
of hypothetical statutory liens granted special priority by the applicable state law. These 
statutory liens are expressly excluded in the definitions of a lien contained i)l the section." 
1 A lien is a right independent of bankruptcy and is a charge against assets which must 
be met before distribution to unsecured creditors. A priority is a creature of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and is an unsecured claim over other claims in the distribution of the bank-
rupt's remaining assets. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, Moore ed., 1f64.02, pp. 2054-2055 (1941). 
8 See note 2 supra. The statute was intended only to affect those rights which were 
acquired under an equitable or common law lien, as opposed to statutory lien. See note 
6 supra. See also 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, Moore ed., 1f1f67.12, 67.20 et seq. See, generally, 
Hanna, "Preferences as Affected by Section 60c and 70b of Bankruptcy Law," 25 WASH. 
L. R.Ev. I (1950). 
9 "Under the terms of the Act where the trustee (borrower) has in his possession 
goods which are the subject matter of the trust receipt transaction and retains same in his 
possession, the security interest or lien of the entruster (lender) attaches to such goods 
when the trust receipt is executed ... .'' Commercial Credit Corp. v. Horan, note 5 
supra, at 628; Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment Co., note 5 supra; General Finance Corp. 
v. Krause Motor Sales, note 5 supra. 
10 See, e.g., A.L.I., Uniform Commercial Code, §9-306, p. 652 at 654 where it is stated: 
"Whether a debtor's sale of collateral was authorized or unauthorized, prior law [refer-
ring to §10 of the UTRA] generally gave the secured party a claim to the proceeds." See 
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interpretative problem in extending the entruster's interest beyond identi-
fiable proceeds to the debtor's general assets.11 Section 175 expressly 
states that the entruster's interest is valid as " ... to any proceed or value 
of any proceeds (whether such proceeds are identifiable or not) of the 
goods. . . ."1 2 But the court in the principal case, without express 
reference to any Illinois decisions, found (1) because §175 of the act 
contains the word "priority" rather than "lien" and, (2) since the act 
was enactecJ before state-created priorities were cut off in bankruptcy 
proceedings, that the drafters of the act actually intended to give the 
entruster a priority interest rather than a lien interest.1 3 The second of 
these points, however, in fact presents a sound basis for explaining away 
the use of the word priority when a lien interest was intended.14 And 
this conclusion is further buttressed by the expressed intent of the draft-
ers of the Uniform Trust Receipts Actl5 and by Illinois decisions1 6 which 
indicate the trend of the state law. Since the drafters intended that the 
entruster should receive a lien interest the court has failed to interpret 
the statute with reasonable insight into the purpose underlying its 
enactment. 
Finally, the result that the second trust receipt, covering the ten trucks, 
constitutes a voidable preference under the Bankruptcy Act, section 60a 
is plausible only upon acceptance of the court's determination that a 
trust receipt transaction affords a mere priority interest to the entruster.17 
also authorities cited in note 11 infra, where a majority of cases facing the problem have 
allowed a lien interest to attach to the proceeds. 
11 This problem has been considered in other jurisdictions, which have held that a 
lien interest created under a trust receipt transaction extends to the general assets of the 
trustee. Commercial Union Bank of Nashville v. Alexander, (Tenn. App. 1958) 312 S.W. 
(2d) 611; In re Harpeth Motors, (D.C. Tenn. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 863; Universal Credit 
Corp. v. Citizen State Bank, 224 Ind. I, 64 N.E. (2d) 28 (1945). See Bogert; "Effect of 
Uniform Trust Receipts Act," 3 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 26 (1935); Hendl, "Trust Receipt 
Financing," 26 CHI•KENT L. REv. 197 (1948). 
12 See note I supra. 
13 See principal case at 226. 
14 That is to say if the court recognizes that the drafters intended to give the entruster 
the equivalent of a lien interest, despite the use of the word priority, then the court should 
have given weight to such intent. 
15 "In the event of the trustee's insolvency, it [referring to the UTRA] simplifies the 
proof in administration proceedings by allowing a preference for any proceeds of released 
security which have been received by the trustee within ten days, so far as the trustee 
was under a duty to account for such proceeds." HANDBOOK, NAT. CONF. OF COMMRS. ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAw 251 (1933); 9C U.L.A. 225 (1957). 
16 See note 9 supra. 
17 The court, principal case at 227, accepts Commercial's contention that the second 
trust receipt was given in release of the prior trust receipt. In view of the court's con• 
struction of the interests created by the first trust receipt it rightly concludes that the 
transaction is a voidable preference under §60a of the Bankrupcty Act, note 3 supra. How-
ever, accepting the contention that the trust receipt creates a valid lien interest in the 
debtor's general assets, §60a does not apply. To constitute a voidable preference the 
bank must dispose of property so as to diminish the estate against which his creditors can 
claim; a transfer of proceeds to which the bankrupt is not entitled does not have such 
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The co:urt's failure to interpret the word priority in the context ap-
parently intended by the drafters of the act results in the serious im-
pairment of the trust receipt as a mode of commercial security and seems 
to place a greater weight on semantics than on reality. 
Barry I. Fredericks 
an effect and therefore is not a preferential transfer. In re Loring, (D.C. Mass. 1939) 30 
F. Supp. 758; Bielaski v. Nat. City Bank of New York, (2d Cir. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 723; 
Crosby v. Sproul, (D.C. Mass. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 325, affd. sub nom. Crosby v. Packer, 
(1st Cir. 1929) 22 F. (2d) 611; Nat. Bank of Newport, N.Y. v. Nat. Herkimer County 
Bank of Little Falls, 225 U.S. 178 (1912); Western Tie&: Timber Co. v. Brown, 196 U.S. 
502 (1905). The transfer of a second lien interest to the entruster for a release of a prior 
valid lien interest does not deprive the bankrupt's estate of any assets, against which his 
creditors can claim; hence, the transaction lies outside the thrust of §60a of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Cf. Walker v. Clinton State Bank, (8th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 165; Pearson 
v. Rapstine, (5th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 313. 
